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REVOLVING DOORS -  WE GOT IT BACKWARDS 
Hadar Y. Jabotinsky* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Eric Ben-Artzi is a brave man. The former Deutsche Bank risk 
officer was one of three whistleblowers who reported improper 
accounting at the German bank to regulators in 2010 and 2011. In 
2015, the US Securities and Exchange Commission imposed a $55 
million fine against the bank over the issue. Ben-Artzi is due a share 
of 15% of this sum, adding up to $8.25 million. In an opinion piece in 
the Financial Times on Thursday, he revealed that he had rejected the 
payout. . . . In his piece, Ben-Artzi really homes in on two hot-button 
issues that get a lot of people on Wall Street uncomfortable: the 
revolving door between Wall Street and regulators, and the regulators' 
propensity to fine the firm, rather than the individual. On the first 
issue, he details the numerous Deutsche Bank lawyers who moved to 
and from the firm and the SEC. This is common on Wall Street, and it 
is something that the Federal Reserve for one has sought to address. 
For example, bank supervisors at the Fed can't join a bank that they 
had been supervising for a year after leaving. Still, the relationship 
between Wall Street banks and the regulators supervising them 
continues to be a focus...”1 
 
The revolving door phenomenon in the financial markets, in which 
senior public officials transfer from the public service to the private 
sector after finishing their term as public officials, and vice versa, is 
widespread.2 This gives rise to concern of regulatory capture, which 
happens when the regulators respond, via regulations, to the wishes of 
 
* Research Fellow at the Hadar Jabotinsky Center for Interdisciplinary Research of Financial Markets, 
Crisis and Technology. I am grateful to all of the following people who have read all or parts of this paper 
and/or discussed it with me: Eric Ben-Artzi, Stijn Claessens, Sharon Hannes, Ariel Porat, Assaf Hamdani, 
Doron Teichman, Eyal Zamir, Alessandro Romano, Omri Ben Zvi, Yael Kariv, Ori Katz, Israel Klein, 
Olga Frishman, Johanna Silverio and Sharon Ramon thank you all for your time and input. Any mistakes 
or omissions are, of course, my own. Also, a big thanks to the Harry and Michael Sacher Institute for 
Legislative Research and Comparative Law at the Hebrew University Law School, to Nissim Cohen and 
the Public Policy Department at Haifa University and to Adam Hofri - Winogradow from the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem Law School, all of whom have contributed to the making of this paper. 
 1. Matt Turner, A Deutsche Bank Whistleblower Just Pulled a Gutsy Move to Highlight What's 
Wrong with Wall Street, BUS. INSIDER, Aug. 18, 2016. 
 2. Just to mention a very limited list in the US financial market, Alan Greenspan who served as 
chair of the Federal Reserve became an advisor for hedge fund Paulson & Co. after leaving the Fed., 
Richard Walker, Deutsche bank’s longtime general counsel (who recently left the bank) was once head 
of enforcement at the SEC, Lawrence Summers, who, while serving as Treasury Secretary, pressed for 
deregulating the financial markets then moved to D.E Shaw hedge fund and many more. 
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strong interest groups (also known as pressure groups), such as the 
regulated industry, instead of protecting the interests of the general 
public.3  
To overcome this problem, many countries have enacted laws that 
try to reduce the industry’s ability to capture the regulator. One of the 
most common methods to combat regulatory capture is through 
mandatory cooling-off periods for senior officials, which are often 
required by conflict of interest rules.4 A cooling-off period is basically 
a limited period of time in which a public official is precluded from 
working for those parts of the private sector with which he had contact 
during the time he was in office.  
The underlying logic is that the passage of time will create a buffer 
between the (former) regulator and his previous job as a civil servant, 
weaken his connections with his former employees and co-workers, 
and neutralize his ability to affect their decisions.  This, the thinking 
goes, would make the regulator less desirable to the regulated firms 
ex-post, and thus reduce his exposure to pressure by the industry ex-
ante, i.e during his term as a regulator.5 This is also the reason cooling-
off periods, usually one to two years, are widely used around the world, 
including in the United States. In fact, the U.S. and a few other 
countries have also demanded a cooling-off period for the other side 
of the revolving door, namely, for people joining the public sector after 
working in the private sector. Typically, such cooling-off periods 
preclude the newly-hired public officials from handling any issues 
related to their previous job and/or employer for a few months or 
years.6 
This Article proposes that although revolving doors do incur some 
costs, they also offer certain benefits, and might, if designed correctly, 
increase the quality of supervision.  The main argument of this Article 
is that due to specific behavioral biases such as the Availability bias 
and the Lock-In bias, combined with office socialization processes that 
occur while the individual serves as a public official, regulators who 
 
 3. MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); George 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3–21 (1971); Sam 
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,  19 J. L. & ECON. 211, 211 (1976). 
 4. For example: 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2018) which restricts federal employees in the executive branch 
of government in performing certain activities for private parties post-employment with the government.  
 5. It is important to note that even though this article chooses to focus on revolving doors in the 
financial markets and the cooling-off periods designed to reduce or prevent regulatory capture in this 
market, it is not at all unique to the financial sector and is, in fact, a mechanism which is used in many 
other sectors as well.  
 6. See for example the instructions that President Obama issued on January 21, 2009, when he 
came into office – Exec. Order No. 13490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
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join the private sector tend to comply more with regulatory instructions 
issued by their previous colleagues than other senior executives. That 
is because, at least in their first few months after leaving public office, 
they still identify strongly with the staff of the regulatory body for 
which they used to work.  
Additionally, this Article argues that the possibility of moving from 
the public sector to the private sector increases the chances that 
regulatory institutions will hire top experts for relatively low pay. 
Obviously, this improves the quality of the regulatory work and the 
resulting regulation. Where the ability to transfer from the public 
sector to the private sector is curtailed, the quality of regulation will 
decline and this would, eventually, undermine the overall public 
welfare that the regulation seeks to promote.  
This Article does not intend to argue that every regulator is subject 
to socialization processes and behavioral biases to an extent that 
influences his or her behavior. Nor does this Article attempt to 
establish that these processes are the dominant incentives for 
regulators in every regulatory setting. The thesis of this Article is that 
socialization processes and behavioral biases may affect regulatory 
behaviour in a way that contradicts the classic capture theory. This 
possibility has gone, so far, almost unnoticed. A future line of research 
will be necessary to empirically test this theory and to identify the 
specific regulatory settings where these incentives are more likely to 
be acted upon and influence regulatory behavior. 
It is a popular belief that moving from the public sector to the private 
sector is an opportunistic, negative act, while moving from the private 
sector to the public sector is seen as desirable and even altruistic. This 
paper sheds light on the less-discussed problems lurking on the other 
side of the revolving door: moving from the private sector to the public 
sector. These problems result from the behavioral biases and 
socialization processes mentioned above, and which have a lingering 
effect on the regulators’ performance abilities as civil servants. It is 
these processes that make it easier for the regulators to be unwittingly 
captured  and create an opening for the regulated industry to affect the 
due process of regulation.  
II. THE NEED FOR AND COSTS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION  
Financial markets have special attributes that require regulatory 
intervention. They are complex markets that are abundant with 
externalities, asymmetric information, moral hazard, and agency 
3
Jabotinsky: Revolving Doors - We Got It Backwards
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] REVOLVING DOORS—WE GOT IT BACKWARDS 435 
problems.7 These markets bring together sellers and buyers of financial 
instruments where price discovery is established. The price of the 
traded instrument is determined, like the price of any other product in 
regular non-financial markets—by the supply and demand curve.8 
However, unlike non-financial products or goods, financial 
instruments have a special trait: the benefits that they confer are largely 
unknown, as the underlying product has a prospect of earnings in the 
unknown future. Therefore, their value is based on the prediction of 
the traders in the market with respect to the future cashflows and 
appreciation of the financial instrument over time.9 Price discovery is 
one of the core functions of financial markets, providing information 
about investors’ belief with regard to the future price of the assets sold 
on the market.10 The price of the financial instrument should reflect the 
present value of the distribution of prices at the date on which the 
investor expects to sell the instrument plus the sum of the present value 
of the stream of future cashflows. To accurately price the financial 
instruments, investors need to have all relevant information about the 
asset and about the firm marketing it. Financial regulators provide 
information to the market, mainly through the vehicle of disclosure 
requirements, which in turn helps the market assign the right price tag 
to the products sold.11 
Furthermore, in the financial markets, some products mature over a 
long period of time, causing a need for regulatory monitoring that is 
exacerbated by consumer demand for regulation and economies of 
scale in monitoring. Moreover, the financial firms in these markets are 
crucially important, from a systemic point of view, to the health of the 
economy in general. Systemic risk is increased by links and 
interdependencies, where the failure of a single entity or cluster of 
entities can cause a cascading failure. This risk needs to be mitigated 
by regulatory requirements demanding firms to internalize their costs.  
For all these reasons, financial regulation is crucial. However, it is 
also costly. The costs of financial regulation may often prevent the 
market from reaching an optimum.12 These costs include costs of 
regulatory mistakes, systemic risk caused by financial regulation,13 
distortion of competition, costs of fragmentation of the regulatory 
 
 7. HADAR Y. JABOTINSKY, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (2017). 
 8. JOHN ARMOUR, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 101 (2016). 
 9. Id. at 101.  
 10. Id.  
 11. JABOTINSKY, supra note 7.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions: 
Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture, 31 YALE J. REG. 1, 1 (2014). 
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regime,14 and regulatory capture.  
III. REGULATORY CAPTURE 
The traditional approach to regulation, the “public interest 
approach”, refers to regulators as public servants who make policy 
determinations according to their perception of what the public 
wants.15 Under this approach, if regulators happen to favor the 
regulated industry in exercising their regulatory power, it would be due 
to their belief that this is in line with the public interest.16 The idea of 
a captured regulator contradicts this approach.  
The issue of a captured regulator who oversees the industry in a 
lenient way is not a new phenomenon and has been broadly discussed 
by the literature for many years.17 According to the literature, a 
captured regulator will tend to be less vigilant when supervising the 
industry and will act according to the interests of the regulated firms 
rather than in accordance with its mandate: to promote the public’s 
welfare. This is known as the "private interest" theory of regulation, 
which describes the regulatory process as a competition between two 
interest groups. Under the private interest theory, the regulated 
industry is well organized and coordinated and is therefore able to 
extract rents at the expense of the public, which is more dispersed and 
less informed.18  
Under this theory, the strong, organized industry is able to capture 
the regulator and influence decisions in a way which promotes the 
interests of the regulated firms. This theory takes into account the fact 
that regulation has broad distributive ramifications: it affects the 
division of wealth within the society and usually increases the costs to 
the regulated firms by disrupting them from operating freely in the 
market in a way which would have maximized their profits. If the 
regulation is successful, it will cause the regulated firms to internalize 
their costs. Therefore, it is not surprising that different pressure groups 
try and influence the regulator in order to minimize the respective harm 
they would incur from the regulation. 19 If the pressure group is 
successful, it will capture the regulator—the regulator will promote the 
 
 14. Hadar Y. Jabotinsky, The Federal Structure of Financial Supervision: A Story of Information-
Flow, 22 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 54 (2017). 
 15. Michael E. Levine & Jennifer Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public 
Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6. J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 168–69 (1990). 
 16. Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 28–31 (2000). 
 17. See Bernstein, supra note 3; Stigler, supra note 3; Peltzman, supra note 3. 
 18 . Id.  
 19. Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 
Q. J . ECON. 371 (1983). 
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interests of the pressure group rather than that of the general public.20   
It should be noted that there are several ways in which the industry 
is able to capture its regulator.21 One way is intuitive—the pressure 
group influences the regulatory work by putting direct pressure on the 
regulator to change or cancel regulations. Under this framework, the 
pressure group makes sure to keep close connections with the 
legislators and regulators in the market, to contribute to political 
campaigns through political action committees (“PACs”), for 
example, and to organize fundraisers for politicians.  All this is done 
with the intent of being able to influence the politician or regulator 
once she goes into office. As one op-ed noted, “It’s hard to adopt 
the Conan the Barbarian approach when you know that the boss of the 
folks you’re talking to is hosting a big fundraising dinner for your 
ultimate bosses in Congress and the White House.”22 
In addition, the industry might implicitly suggest that it will hire the 
regulator once her term in office is over. If the regulator is aware of 
the fact that there is a high likelihood she will be employed by the 
regulated industry, this might cause her to act with caution and 
minimize the harm to the regulated industry in her role as a regulator. 
This might sometimes come at the expense of the public's interest.23 If 
the regulator starts looking for her next job while she is still in office, 
she might be inclined to provide the industry with benefits, such as 
aiding a specific regulated firm to win a bid that is under her 
supervisory responsibility, demanding less stringent conditions from 
the industry with regard to approving and signing agreements, or 
giving the industry a reduction in fees.  
A second way in which the regulator might be captured relates to 
the fact that the regulated financial industry is usually better organized 
and better financed than the general public or other groups active in 
the regulatory sphere (such as consumer NGOs).  The problem is 
rooted in the fact that the financial firms usually have the resources to 
hire the best experts in the field in order to try and tilt the regulatory 
decisions in their favor. Moreover, it is very easy for a regulated firm 
to locate other regulated firms with similar interests and to cooperate 
with them in communicating with the regulator. This is not the case 
for consumers who face severe coordination problems that are coupled 
 
 20. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).  
 21. See Becker, supra note19; Olson, supra note20; Bernstein, supra note 3; Stigler, supra note 3; 
Peltzman, supra note 3.  
 22. Megan McArdel, It’s Normal for Regulators to Get Captured, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Oct. 1, 
2014, 11:42 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-09-30/it-s-normal-for-regulators-
to-get-captured.  
 23. Jeffrey E. Cohen, The dynamics of the “revolving door” on the FCC, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI. 689, 
689–708 (1986). 
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with lack of funding and inability to locate all other consumers affected 
by the regulation. It is, therefore, only natural that the regulated firms 
will present more convincing arguments to the regulators. In such an 
unbalanced situation, the industry captures the regulator and the 
regulator will promote decisions that benefit the industry instead of 
regulating to promote the public welfare.24 In addition, regulators 
usually shy away from negative public opinions, especially in the 
media. The worst negative feedback usually comes from the organized 
industry and not from the general public. Therefore, regulators are 
sometimes tempted to compromise on less strict regulation in return 
for peace and quiet.  
A third way in which a regulator might find herself captured relates 
to the fact that the financial industry is a repeat player. During the day-
to-day regulatory work, the regulator learns to trust the discretion of 
the experts who work for the financial firms. Thus, the regulator might 
forget that these experts are examining the regulatory issue through the 
lens of being employed by the supervised firms. When the regulator 
relies heavily on experts, decisions could be made solely based on their 
expert opinion without question. In this case, the regulator becomes 
unknowingly captured.25  Furthermore, the regulator receives the 
information from the regulated industry. Thus, the information that the 
regulators receive is always biased toward the perspective of the 
regulated industry. In addition, the regulators often only get what they 
ask for, which is not always the same information that they need to 
effectively regulate.  
The “New Governance” phenomenon,26 in which the industry plays 
an active role in formulating the regulation by participating in 
legislative committees, meeting and holding regular discussions with 
the regulators, and proposing regulatory amendments, intensifies the 
problem because it increases the interaction between the regulator and 
the regulated firms. This leads to a situation in which, often times, the 
regulator is required by law to consult with the industry prior to or 
during the process of her work. The greater the interaction between the 
regulator and the regulated industry, the more likely the industry is to 
capture the regulator, whether wittingly or otherwise.  
In an attempt to limit the possibilities for financial firms to openly 
capture their regulator by promising future benefits, various 
 
 24. See Becker, supra note19.  
 25. Daniel C. L. Hardy, Regulatory Capture in Banking 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 
No. 06, Vol. 34, 2006). 
 26. Roderick A. W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing without Government, 44 POL. 
STUD. 652 (1996); Lisa B. Bingham et al., The New Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder 
and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 547 (2005). 
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researchers have pointed their fingers at the “revolving door” 
phenomenon. The basic idea is that this phenomenon increases the 
industry’s ability to capture the regulator. Many scholars assume that 
if we rule out or reduce the revolving door phenomenon, we will also 
significantly reduce the industry’s ability to capture the regulator 
because it will not be able to promise her benefits like senior jobs 
within the industry once her term as a regulator is over. One proposed 
way to limit the revolving door phenomenon is by enforcing cooling-
off periods, in which the regulator may not work for any entity that she 
has previously overseen. The length of cooling-off periods varies from 
country to country and sometimes even from sector to sector.  
IV. REVOLVING DOORS – ANCILLARY PROBLEMS, EXISTING SOLUTIONS 
Under the influence of the capture narrative, the risk of capture has become 
the dominant concern about the revolving door. The potentially debilitating 
role of the revolving door was highlighted by Mary Schapiro during her 
Senate confirmation hearing, in which she stated that a conflict might be 
created by SEC regulators “walking out the door and going to a firm and 
leaving everybody to wonder whether they showed some favor to that firm 
during their time at the SEC.” The revolving door has also been blamed for 
a series of high-profile regulatory failures ranging from the SEC’s failures 
to prevent the Ponzi schemes of Bernard Madoff and R. Allen Stanford to 
federal regulators’ failures to prevent the BP oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico.27 
The revolving door phenomenon is not new and has, for quite a few 
years, been on the agenda not only of specific jurisdictions, but also of 
international organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development.28 It also goes hand in hand with other 
problems that are liable to undermine the regulator’s performance and 
adversely affect public trust. 
First, as mentioned above, the revolving door might help the 
industry capture the regulator, because she may go job hunting at the 
regulated firms while still in office. Most scholars believe that the best 
way to control this is to stipulate cooling-off periods by law. This 
attitude is mirrored in most jurisdictions by mandatory cooling-off 
 
 27. Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1268 (2015). 
 28. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, POST-PUBLIC 
EMPLOYMENT: GOOD PRACTICES FOR PREVENTING CONFLICT OF INTEREST 11-14 (2010) (“OECD 
Report”); CHRISTOPH DEMKE ET AL., REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR HOLDERS OF PUBLIC 
OFFICE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION - A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE RULES AND STANDARDS OF 
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS FOR THE HOLDERS OF PUBLIC OFFICE IN THE EU-27 AND EU INSTITUTIONS 
(European Commission, October 2007). 
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period for regulators entering the private sector.29  
Secondly, the “revolving door” increases the risk that the regulator 
would later join a lobbying agency hired by the regulated firms in order 
to promote their interests. This is a slight variation on the first risk 
described above. Here, the concern is not that the regulator would be 
more lenient while in office, but that as a lobbyist, she would take 
advantage of the personal connections she made while in office. Such 
connections could significantly assist private firms to influence the 
new regulator to favor their interests over those of the public. A 
regulator who becomes a lobbyist could use her connections to gain 
access to confidential information and obtain meetings that otherwise 
would not take place. In this manner she could slant regulatory 
decisions in favor of her new clients.30 The same problems arise in the 
context of a regulator that now works for a firm that she previously 
supervised: she might manipulate her personal relationships with her 
former employees to obtain concessions and special treatment for her 
new employer.  The cooling-off period is also meant to limit the 
regulator’s ability to abuse the connections she has made while in 
office to advance the goals of the lobbying agency for which she now 
works. . 
Thirdly, there is the “side swapping” problem. Sometimes, a 
regulator handles a statutory process over many months, but does not 
complete the process before she steps down. If, at the end of her term 
in office, the regulator starts working for one of the firms that stands 
to be impacted by that legislation, she might be required to represent 
this firm in procedures pertaining to the legislation she had handled 
while still in office. This affords her with exceptional insight as to the 
shortcomings of the legislation, which she might use in order to thwart 
the process or cause the proposed bill to be amended according to the 
interests of the private enterprise for which she is now working. In 
addition, the former regulator might use inside information. Exposure 
to sensitive information in her capacity as a regulator might cause a 
conflict of interest once she starts working for a firm that she used to 
regulate. 31 Finally, there is also a risk if the former regulator is retained 
 
 29. See for example the one-year cooling-off period required under federal law (12 U.S.C. § 
1820(k)) for receiving any compensation – as an employee, officer, director, or consultant – from a 
previously supervised institution. See also 18 U.S.C. § 207; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.; 5 C.F.R §§ 2637 
(2004) ("Regulations concerning post employment conflict of interest"), 2641 (2004) ("Post-employment 
conflict of interest restrictions"); 48 C.F.R. § 3.104-2(b)(3) (2004). 
 30. OECD report, supra note 28, at 27.  
 31. Many countries are sensitive to this issue and forbid using insider information received while 
under office. The Canadian law for example forbids providing “advice to his or her client, business 
associate or employer using information that was obtained in his or her capacity as a public office holder 
and is not available to the public” Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, C.9, S.2, art. 34(2) (Can.). Norway 
9
Jabotinsky: Revolving Doors - We Got It Backwards
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] REVOLVING DOORS—WE GOT IT BACKWARDS 441 
by the regulatory body as a consultant. This practice might cause a 
conflict of interest if the new regulator favors his predecessor over 
other advisors because of their personal acquaintance.Among other  32 
things, this could also impair public trust of the regulatory body.  
Many scholars from different countries have considered the 
problems arising from the revolving door phenomenon and proposed 
various solutions. 33 Following this academic debate, several 
jurisdictions passed laws enforcing cooling-off periods for regulators 
and other high officials. Many of them stipulate a cooling-off period 
(normally one to two years) for moving from a regulatory body into 
the industry, 34 while others, including the U.S., stipulate a cooling-off 
period in the other direction as well, such that for several months or 
years, the regulator may not have any communication with the private 
enterprise for which he used to work, and may not handle any matter 
directly relating to that enterprise.35 
Many countries, including Belgium, 36 Australia, 37 Canada, 38 
Finland, 39 Ireland, 40  Mexico, 41 Norway, 42 Poland, 43 Turkey44, the 
 
also published restrictions meant to protect sensitive governmental information, information pertaining to 
competitors and to strengthen the public's trust in the regulatory institutions (Norway, “Post-Employment 
Guidelines for the Public Service”, (July 2005a); Norway, “Post-Employment Guidelines for Politicians”, 
(November 2005b)). 
 32. OECD report, supra note 28, at 30.  
 33. See Hardy, supra note 25. For a leading narrative of the financial crisis of 2007 – 2009 
associates the revolving door to conflicts of interest that contributed to distorted credit ratings and to lack 
of regulation see Elisabeth Kempf, The Job Rating Game: The Effects of Revolving Doors on Analyst 
Incentives, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2017).  
 34. OECD report, supra note 28.  
 35. See Exec. Order No. 13490, supra note 6, at § 2. 
 36. Deontologische code van de Vlaamse volksvertegenwoordigers inzake dienstverlening aan de 
bevolking [Ethics Code for Members of the Flemish Parliament Concerning Service Provision) of  Mar. 
17, 1999, http://docs.vlaamsparlement.be/docs/stukken/1998-1999/g7a-1.pdf. 
 37. Lobbying Code of Conduct 2008, Statement of Ministerial Standards 2013, art. 2.24 (Austl.) 
(available at: www.pmc.gov.au/guidelines/index.cfm.).   
 38. Federal Accountability Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9 (Can.); Lobbying Act R.S.C. 1985, c. 44 (Can.); 
Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, S. 2 (Can.); Canadian Government Standards of Ministerial Ethics 
(2007). 
 39. Finnish Ministry of Finance, Guidelines for the Transfer of an Official to the Service of 
Another Employer (2007). 
 40. Ethics in Public Office Act. 1995(Act No. 22/1995) (Ir.); Standards in Public Office Act 2001 
(Act No. 32/2001) (Ir.). 
 41. Ley Federal de Responsabilidades Administrativas de los Servidores Públicos 
[LFRA][(Federal Law of Administrative Liabilities of Public Officials], Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DO], 13 de Marzo de 2002 (Mex.). 
 42 . See supra note 19.  
 43. Limitations on Conducting Business Activity by Persons Performing Public Functions Act, 
No. 106, Item 679 (1997) (Pol.). 
 44. Law on Prohibitions of Post-public Employment, No. 2531 (1981) (Turk.). 
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EU45 and the US,46 have imposed a cooling-off period for transitioning 
from the public to the private sector. These instructions and regulations 
impose restrictions on hiring senior public officials and stipulate 
standards that the regulators must follow while in office. 47 Other 
countries tried to fend off the problem of "switching sides" by 
extending the term in public office and increasing the regulators’ 
salaries to try and stop them from crossing the line into the private 
sector. It is also important to note that some of the most recent debates 
in the media and in professional literature do not even address the 
question of whether a cooling-off period is needed. They take it for 
granted that the answer to this question is an obvious yes and instead 
focus on the optimal length of this period.48 
Let us now tackle one of the key questions contemplated by this 
Article: does the transition of financial regulators from their public 
office to jobs in the private sector necessarily undermine the public 
interest, or could such transition, in certain cases, serve the aggregated 
public utility by improving compliance within the regulated firm? One 
of the arguments in this paper is that while in office, the regulator 
undergoes socialization processes. These processes, combined with 
behavioral biases, will make her a better watchdog within the regulated 
firm. This has a direct effect on the firm and will increase regulatory 
compliance. The next two Sections describe these socialization 
processes, the acquired social identity, and the social biases that will 
serve as discussion tools in the following Sections of this Article.  
V. SOCIALIZATION PROCESSES: SOCIAL IDENTITY 
The Social Identity Theory provides that an individual’s self-
perception also comprises her social belonging and that this, in turn, 
forms the individual’s social identity.49 A “social identity” is defined 
as an integral part of the individual’s self-perception, arising from the 
individual’s knowledge that she belongs to certain social groups. This 
knowledge, combined with the emotional value that the individual has 
attached to her belonging to these groups, creates her de facto social 
 
 45. Code of Conduct for Commissioners, SEC (2004) 1487/2 of 24 November 2004 (EC). 
 46. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(k); 18 U.S.C. § 207; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.; 5 C.F.R §§ 2637, 2641 
(2004) ("Regulations concerning post-employment conflict of interest"; "Post-employment conflict of 
interest restrictions"); 48 C.F.R. § 3.104-2(b)(3) (2004).  
 47. OECD report, supra note 28, at 41-92.  
 48. For a recent example see Mervyn King, The Case for Tough Rules on ‘Revolving Door’ Jobs: 
Any Perception of a Conflict of Interest at Central Banks is Damaging, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2016. 
 49. Henri Tajfel, Social-Psychology of Inter-Group Relations, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 1, 1-39 
(1982).  
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identity.  50 In other words, an individual’s identity comprises, in 
addition to all the other qualities that turn her into who she is,  her 
social identity. This identity makes the individual feel that she belongs 
to a group and, in certain situations, to define herself as a “we” rather 
than as an “I.” When this happens, it shows that the individual has 
psychologically merged with the group. 51 
A social identity gives the individual a sense of belonging and helps 
him determine who he is, who the “others” are, and how and to which 
groups he should associate such “others” (a perception of “us” versus 
“them”).52 Such group affiliations grant the individual utilities arising 
from the social status of his group, his affiliation with the persons who 
represent the “ideal” of the group, and the consistency between his 
behavior and the expectations of the group.53 Studies of social identity 
and socialization focus on a person’s identity as such that it also refers 
to his social affiliation or, in other words, his reference group. Other 
studies have shown that the more connected a person feels to his 
reference group, the more he changes his behavior and perception of 
reality to fit the values of the group. 54  
A person can simultaneously belong to several reference groups, but 
the way she thinks and behaves in the world is influenced by the 
reference group that wields the strongest influence in that context. 55  
As to which of the reference groups has the greatest influence given 
the context depends on how that person “categorizes” herself in that 
context. “Self-categorization” occurs when a person knows the 
“prototype” generated by the social categorization and does whatever 
she can to be like that prototype. This way, the person loses her self-
identity and assimilates with her social group. 56 
In the context of a workplace, the identification levels vary between 
 
 50. Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization, Social Identity and Social Comparison, in HENRY TAJFEL, 
DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL GROUPS 61, 61-76 (1978). 
 51. Jane E. Dutton et al., Organizational Images and Member Identification, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 
239, 239-63 (1994); Daan Van Knippenberg & Ed Sleebos, Organizational Identification versus 
Organizational Commitment: Self-Definition, Social Exchange, and Job Attitudes, 27 J. ORG. BEHAVIOR 
571 (2006); Dennis Veltrop & Jakob de Haan, I Just Cannot Get You Out of My Head: Regulatory Capture 
of Financial Sector Supervisors, 8 (DNB Working Paper No. 410,2014). 
 52. Blake E. Ashforth et al., Identification in Organizations: An examination of Four Fundamental 
Questions, 34 J. MGM. 325, 372 (2008). 
 53. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q. J. ECON. 715 (2000). 
 54. Stuart Albert et al., Organizational Identity and Identification: Charting New Waters and 
Building New Bridges, 25 ACAD. MGM. REV. 13 (2000); Naomi Ellemers et al., Motivating Individuals 
and Groups at Work: A Social Identity Perspective on Leadership and Group Performance, 29 ACAD. 
MGM. REV. 459 (2004).  
 55. Ashforth et al., supra note 52.  
 56. Michael A. Hogg & Deborah J. Terry, Social Identity and Self-Categorization Processes in 
Organizational Contexts, 25 ACAD. MGM. REV. 121, 121 – 40 (2000).   
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employees. The higher the level of identification, the more the 
qualities that the person attributes to the workplace will merge with the 
qualities he attributes to himself. When a person completely identifies 
with his workplace, this is dubbed “organizational identification.” 57 It 
was also found that the more an employee perceives his workplace as 
socially beneficial or ethical, the faster this identification process 
occurs, because he will tend to “bask in the reflected glory” of the 
values that society attributes to his workplace. 58  
The organizational culture of all workplaces is comprised of many 
things: rules of thumb; an internal language shared by the employees, 
or jargon; an organizational ideology that helps direct the behavior of 
individuals within the organization; common standards by which it is 
decided what is relevant to work and what is not; prejudices; 
behavioral models; customs; rituals regarding treating colleagues, 
subordinates, supervisors, and outsiders; and— not the least of which–
a common sense that instructs employees on what is considered 
acceptable and smart behavior in that organization.59 These 
organizational behaviors are so ingrained within an organization’s 
culture that, once an employee has learned them, she perceives it as 
the “natural” way to address the world and problems in the world.60￼  
An organizational culture is created and maintained when the 
individuals joining an organization undergo a socialization process, at 
the end of which they adapt themselves to the organization. This is a 
long process because individuals joining an organization sometimes 
bring norms that are foreign to the organization. They question the 
organizational culture and the way things are done and try to change 
them.  More experienced employees will teach the new ones to see the 
world in the same way as the other employees do, and this can take 
time. 61 In other words, the new employee needs to undergo 
organizational socialization to acquire the knowledge pertaining to the 
organizational behavior that he is expected to follow when performing 
his job.  
The result of organizational socialization is that the individual learns 
which cases to prioritize, how to address daily tasks, how others in the 
workplace perceive her behavior, etc. Employees who have been 
working somewhere long enough develop a sort of “common sense,” 
affected by the cultural values of the organization, which they follow 
 
 57. Dutton et al., supra note 51 at 239-40. 
 58. Id. at 240.   
 59. John Van Maanen & Edgar H. Schein, Toward a Theory of Organizational Socialization, 1-2 
(MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 960, 1977). 
 60. Id. at 2.  
 61. Id. at 2-3. 
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in order to solve problems that arise in the course of their workday. 
This is a perspective that helps them analyze their experience within a 
certain work task, which also influences their decision-making 
process.62 Once an employee has developed this perspective and 
completed the organizational socialization process, she has, by 
definition, also formed a “common knowledge” of how things must be 
handled and how to behave. 63 When an employee changes jobs within 
an organization or gets a new job with another employer, she needs to 
adjust to her new setting and is expected to adopt the norms of the new 
workplace. These transitions can be a shock for the employee, and 
normally involve mental pressure and confusion. Therefore, it usually 
takes a relatively long time before the employee internalizes the norms 
of the new job or organization. The greater the difference between the 
two jobs, the longer the time it takes. 64  
Socialization processes influence the way we behave in the world, 
our relationships with other people, and the choices we make. They are 
of particular relevance to the revolving door phenomenon because they 
could shed a light on the behavior of financial regulators and possibly 
even change the discourse surrounding the analysis of adverse effects 
versus benefits.  
VI. BEHAVIORAL BIASES: AVAILABILITY AND LOCK-IN 
Before analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of revolving 
doors in the financial markets, it is necessary to take into account 
another thing all human beings share: behavioral biases. These biases 
may change the decision making of an individual joining a new 
organization and should, therefore, be taken into account when 
analyzing the revolving door phenomenon.  This Section will review 
the behavioral biases and psychological processes that could come into 
play in the decision-making process of a former regulator now leading 
a private sector enterprise or a former leader of a private firm now 
serving as a regulator: the Availability Bias and the behavioral Lock-
in Bias. 
The Availability Bias contends that in certain situations, people 
evaluate the probability of a specific result based on how easy it is for 
them to recall past events in the same context. For example, people 
tend to estimate the probability of heart attacks in the middle-aged 
population based on the number of heart attacks that happened to 
middle-aged people whom they know. Similarly, people tend to 
 
 62. Id.at 4. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 8-10.  
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estimate the probability of success or failure of a certain kind of 
business based on the number of success or failure cases of businesses 
in that category of which they know.65  
Availability is a useful tool for estimating probability or recurrence, 
because recurring events “burn” into our available memory more than 
unusual events. However, the availability bias is affected by other 
factors in addition to probability or recurrence.  66 One such factor is 
the way that we are exposed to an event. For example, if someone 
personally sees a house on fire, they will think that fires are much more 
common than if they had only read about them in the newspapers. 67 
Because of the characteristics of this bias, it is particularly relevant to 
the debate included later in this Article regarding the transitions of 
regulators to leading positions in firms that they had previously 
regulated, and vice versa.  
People tend to stick to their old habits. This is known as “Behavioral 
Lock-In,” and occurs mainly when a person has invested time and 
money toward learning a certain practice, using a product in a certain 
way, or acquiring a habitual approach to solving problems.  In these 
cases, people follow their old habits even if more effective alternatives 
could be found. This could be due to organizational learning, personal 
habits, or cultural bias. 68 In other words, it is almost impossible to 
teach old dogs new tricks. 
It was also found that in the context of working environments, the 
organization has extensive influence over the employees’ habits. Quite 
often, the way things are done at an organization teaches employees to 
work in a certain way and fixes their working habits.69 Once certain 
organizational behavior has fixed bad habits, the organizational status 
quo deters any other behaviors that conflict with good habits. An 
attempt to change employee habits could require much effort and meet 
active resistance from employees. 70 In other words, once a person is 
accustomed to doing something in a certain way, she will continue 
doing it that way, regardless of whether the circumstances have 
changed.    
 
 65. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 
SCI. 1124, 1127 (1974)  
 66. Thus, when presented with lists containing names of both men and women and being asked to 
assess which sex is more common on the list, the answer was affected by the names of famous people – 
if there were more famous men on the list the subjects thought that there were more men than women on 
the list and vice versa. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. William Barnes et al., Old Habits Die Hard: Path Dependency and Behavioral Lock-in, 38 J. 
ECON. ISSUES 371, 372 (2004). 
 69. Id. at 373.  
 70. Id.  
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The habits and availability bias literature holds relevant in the 
context of financial regulators and the quality of regulation as well. 
Understanding and discussing these psychological processes could 
alter the way in which we view revolving doors in the capital market.  
VII. EITHER SIDE OF THE DOOR: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF 
REVOLVING DOORS BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR 
As mentioned above, the literature discusses the possible adverse 
effect of revolving doors on regulators’ performance and suggests that 
this phenomenon increases regulatory capture. However, the direction 
of the revolving door should also be taken into account, as it likely 
influences regulatory capture.  
A. Advantages of revolving doors – public to private sector 
Previously, this Article reviewed the common belief that the 
revolving door phenomenon should be reduced or eliminated. 
However, many other considerations show that this phenomenon 
could, in fact, be positive, especially with regard to the transition of 
senior officials from the public sector to the private sector. Cooling-
off periods are intended mainly to reduce the conflict of interests 
associated with revolving doors, but they can also cause serious and 
sometimes unforeseeable damages. 71 Studies have shown that cooling-
off periods are liable to limit beneficial interaction between the market 
and the regulator and even cause the regulator to invest less in 
acquiring knowledge about the industry that she is to regulate. 72  
These damages were measured empirically by Law & Long, who 
found that in states in the U.S. that enacted cooling-off periods for 
regulators, the expertise of the regulators was lower, the regulators 
spent less time at the office, and invested less in acquiring industry-
related knowledge as compared to their colleagues in states without 
 
 71. Marc T. Law & Cheryl X. Long, Revolving Door Laws and State Public Utility 
Commissioners, 5 REGUL. & GOV’T 405 (2011). It can be assumed that there will be cases in which the 
damage is going to be so high that it will eliminate the upside of the cooling-off period. From an economic 
perspective, the law should restrict regulators from switching sides and working in the regulated industry 
only if the benefits of such restrictions outweigh its costs. The efficiency criteria which should be used in 
making such a policy decision is the Kaldor Hicks efficiency criteria which emphasizes the will to 
maximize the total public welfare. This point is connected also to the Coase Theorem which teaches us of 
the importance of allocating legal rights efficiently due to the presence of transaction costs which prevent 
trading in the norm. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960)). 
 72. Yeon-Koo Che, Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion, 26 RAND  
J. ECON. 378 (1995); David Salant, Behind the Revolving Door: A New View of Public Utility Regulation, 
26 RAND J. ECON. 362 (1995). 
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statutory cooling-off periods.73 In other words, an ex-post reduction or 
neutralizing of the revolving door phenomenon caused an ex-ante 
decline in the quality of regulation. In another study, several scholars 
analyzed the career paths of various lawyers who had left the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). They found that the tougher the 
lawyers were and the more aggressive the regulations they promoted, 
the better their chances were of joining a leading law firm after their 
term with the SEC.74 These findings are in line with the “regulatory 
schooling” view, which claims that regulators have an incentive to 
prefer complex and strict regulation to enhance their future salaries if 
they choose to switch sides and work for the industry later on.75 The 
findings are also in line with the human capital theory, which claims 
that regulators are hired by the industry according to their expertise 
and, thus, have a greater incentive to signal their expertise to the 
industry during their term with the regulatory institution.76  
If, where revolving doors are allowed, regulators who were not 
afraid to pass laws against the industry are indeed more sought after at 
the end of their term than their colleagues who handled the industry 
with kid gloves, this is an incentive for employees of regulatory 
agencies to be vigorous and brave enough to regulate even where 
regulation adversely affects the industry, but upholds the public 
interest. This would not be possible if the revolving door phenomenon 
is drastically reduced. Hence, the revolving door between the 
regulators and the regulated industry seriously motivates regulatory 
employees to enrich their knowledge and do a good job in order to be 
more attractive for potential employers in the private sector after their 
term in public office. Furthermore, the revolving door phenomenon 
has another positive aspect: it enables the public sector to recruit better 
experts and to pay a salary which is relatively low compared to the 
private sector. This is because excellent experts are willing to 
contribute a few years of their lives in order to get to know the public 
sector from the inside, knowing that this knowledge will be sought 
 
 73 . Law & Long, supra note 71.  
 74. Ed DeHaan et al.,, Does the Revolving Door Affect the SEC's Enforcement Outcomes?, J. 
ACCT. & ECON. (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125560. 
 75. David Lucca et al.,,  The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation, 65 J. 
MONETARY ECON. 17, 18 (2014); Sumit Agarwal et al., Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking, 
129 Q. J. ECON. 889, 889 – 938 (2014).  Of course, this is not to say that more complex regulation is also 
more strict, however, if we combine these claims with the findings of Law & Long we can assume that at 
least some of that regulation is also stricter. Law & Long, supra note 71.  
 76. Heski Bar-Isaac & Joel Shapiro, Credit Ratings Accuracy and Analyst Incentives, 101 AM. 
ECON. REV. 120, 120 (2011). 
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after by the private sector later on. 77   Not only that, but also one benign 
view of lobbying is about information transmission of various groups 
making their case.78 This can be facilitated by a revolving door, as it 
means the two parties “speak” the same language, which can allow for 
better regulatory outcomes. Consequently, the more we curtail the 
revolving door phenomenon, the more we reduce the quality of 
regulation. 79  These studies show that regulations intended to prevent 
revolving doors adversely affect the motivation of employees in 
financial regulatory institutions to improve their knowledge and skills.  
In addition, there is another cost to the quality of supervision by 
restricting or prohibiting the revolving door phenomenon. When a 
regulator switches sides and starts working as an executive in one of 
the firms which she previously regulated, she brings with her a 
different attitude to rules and regulations. This attitude includes her 
understanding of the importance of regulation and of its goals, as well 
as the habits which she developed during her term as a regulator, 
especially with regard to decision-making and problem-solving.80 As 
a result of the behavioral biases and the socialization processes 
discussed in preceding Sections, someone who has served as a 
regulator and understands the rationale behind regulation and the need 
for compliance will be more likely to enforce strict procedures inside 
the firm with regard to compliance as opposed to someone who came 
to the job from the private sector.  
Based on the Availability Bias, a regulator who crosses the line to 
the private sector will continue to evaluate situations she encounters in 
the private market through her situational stances as a regulator. The 
ex-regulator was likely exposed to cases in which lack of compliance 
led to regulatory sanctions or the destabilization of a financial firm. 
According to the Availability Bias, people evaluate the occurrence of 
certain results based on their recollection of the past—especially if 
they were directly exposed to it.81 As such, it is likely that the ex-
regulator will be more cautious and will comply more with the 
regulations compared with executives who never served in regulatory 
positions.  Furthermore, the habits which the ex-regulator accumulated 
during her term as a regulator follow her to the new position in the 
 
 77. DeHaan et al., supra note 74. 
 78. Adam William Chalmers, Trading Information for Access: Informational Lobbying Strategies 
and Interest Group Access to the European Union, 20 J. EURO. PUB. POL’Y 39, 40 (2013).  
 79. Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of 
Regulatory Capture, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y 61, 72-73 (1992).  
 80. Once one has served in a regulatory position and has moved to an executive position in one of 
the regulated firms, there may be a better understanding of the exact reasons for the regulation and 
supervision. Outward people movement then may especially be useful in complex areas.  
 81. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 65, at 1127. 
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private sector. If someone is accustomed to solving problems as a 
regulator would, she will continue to approach similar problems in a 
like manner in her new private sector position. Even if the external 
conditions change, such as a change in the workplace, once a person is 
accommodated to doing things in a certain manner, she will continue 
to do them the same way.82 
The literature on socialization processes and on social identity 
strengthens this reasoning.83 According to the social identity theory 
described earlier in this Article, part of our identity of the “self” is 
derived from belonging to a group. In turn, this affects the individual’s 
social identity.84 In the context of a financial regulator who passes 
through the revolving door and starts working for the regulated 
industry, as her social group remains at the regulatory institution for 
which she used to work , she will be more careful  to  avoid decisions 
that will cause her social group in the financial regulatory institution 
to question her motives or personality (according to the Social Identity 
Theory).85 Regulators acquire reputations and connections while 
learning how to adapt to the social norms inside the regulatory 
institution.  The findings of the literature dealing with socialization 
processes in an office setting point out that when an employee changes 
her position and transfers to a different job or position, it takes time 
until her social group changes. Thus, it can be assumed that the day 
after the regulator stops being a regulator she will continue to adhere 
to the same norms and relate to the employees in the regulatory 
institution for which she used to work as her colleagues. What these 
colleagues think of her will still matter. It is very unlikely that a former 
regulator will abandon her social relationships and worldview, and free 
herself of the organizational culture and social identification relating 
to her former workplace, only because she has changed her career.86  
Therefore, cooling-off periods, which are meant to distance the 
regulator from her social group inside the regulatory institution, make 
her less attractive to the regulated industry, and less vulnerable to 
capture during her term as a regulator, might cause more harm than 
 
 82. Barnes et al., supra note 68, at 373. 
 83. Alexander S. Haslam et al.,, Sticking to our Guns: Social Identity as a Basis for the 
Maintenance of Commitment to Faltering Organizational Projects, 27 J. ORG. BEHAV. 607 (2006); 
Ashforth et al., supra note 52; Tajfel, supra note 49. 
 84. Tajfel, supra note 49.  
 85. This claim is strengthened by the research on social identity which shows that it takes a long 
time for an employee to change her social group from one group to the other. Maanen & Schein, supra 
note 59, at 8–10. 
 86. Id. See also the empirical work of DeHaan et al., supra note 74, at 11, who claim something 
similar with regards to the other side of the revolving door: they claim that the longer a regulator has 
served in the private sector the more he tends to identify himself with it. 
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good. This is because they also cool off the identification of the 
regulator with her social group within the regulatory institution and her 
behavioral biases, as work habits tend to wear off after a while and the 
availability of events is strongest when those events were recent.  On 
the other hand, it seems that the threats of the revolving door come 
from the other side–when people enter the regulatory institution after 
serving in the private sector for a while—especially inside the 
regulated firms.  
B. disadvantages of revolving doors – private to public sector 
The revolving door phenomenon has two sides and also includes 
employees who enter the regulatory institutions after being employed 
by the regulated firms.87 This side of the revolving door has many 
advantages, such as enriching the regulatory institution with 
knowledge of employees who worked for the industry.  These former 
employees understand the material and know exactly how things work 
in the regulated firms. This knowledge also includes also an 
institutional and business understanding of the regulated industry, as 
well as practical knowledge with regards to how things are done. This 
type of knowledge might positively contribute to the regulatory 
institution and to the understanding of the optimal regulatory solutions 
to perceived market failures. However, transferring from the regulated 
industry into the regulatory institution could also result in the regulator 
being unknowingly captured. In fact, there is some empirical evidence 
that the appointment of a former regulated firm employee to an 
executive position within the regulatory institution does increase the 
likelihood of regulatory decisions that favor the industry.88 But why 
does this happen? In this context, the self-categorization of the 
individual is highly important.89 Self-categorization affects the 
individual’s self-determination: when an individual categorizes herself 
into a group, her own personal identity is somewhat merged with the 
group. Regulators who are involved with the industry identify with it 
from a psychological point of view. This might cause them to provide 
the regulated industry with benefits or regulate it less strictly. In other 
 
 87. A few examples were mentioned in Eric Ben-Artzi’s opinion article: “Robert Rice, the chief 
lawyer in charge of the internal investigation at Deutsche in 2011, became the SEC’s chief counsel in 
2013. Robert Khuzami, Deutsche’s top lawyer in North America, became head of the SEC’s enforcement 
division after the financial crisis…”  Eric Ben-Artzi, We Must Protect Shareholders from Executive 
Wrongdoing, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2016. 
 88. William T. Gormley, A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
665, 681 (1979); Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement 
Against Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. L. 679, 725–26 (2012). 
 89. DeHaan et al., supra note 74, at 8–9.  
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words, “Social identification with the financial sector would lead 
financial supervisors to internalize group-defining (i.e. financial 
sector) characteristics in their self-concept and strive for behaviors that 
are prototypical for this sector…”90  
Such identification with the regulated industry might cause the new 
regulator to implement norms and set a regulatory standard that favors 
the regulated firms and is against the public interest. In such 
circumstances, the regulator is no longer objective. When a regulator 
is not objective and favors the interests of the regulated industry, she 
is actually captured by the industry without being aware of it.91  
It is reasonable to assume that an individual who has worked for 
years in a regulated firm and with the employees in the regulated 
industry will still maintain good and close connections to her former 
colleagues. These close connections might cause the regulator, 
sometimes unknowingly, to soften the regulatory requirements in 
order to assist the regulated industry.92  Indeed, empirical research in 
this area proves that the longer the regulator worked in the private 
sector, the greater the risk of capture.93 Here, the fear is that the 
regulator will not feel comfortable burdening her former colleagues 
and supervisors and will act to please them.  
In addition, a regulator who transfers from the regulated industry to 
the regulatory institution might be caught in a mindset of promoting 
business at all cost.  In fact, such a regulator is likely to view the issues 
at hand with an industry eye and sympathize with the regulated 
industry.94 This too might interfere with the ability to regulate 
according to what is needed in order to promote the public interests. 
This claim is further strengthened when the behavioral biases 
 
 90. Veltrop & De Haan, supra note 51.    
 91. Id. 
 92. DeHaan et al., supra note 74; Maanen & Schein, supra note 59, at 8–10. 
 93. DeHaan et al., supra note 74, at 8–9; Kevin L. Young et al., Beyond the Revolving Door: 
Advocacy Behavior and Social Distance to Financial Regulators, 19 BUS. & POL. 327, 327 (2017) 
(Finding that: “The financial system is governed not just by formal rules but also by social relationships 
that pervade the elite strata of society. Understanding such dynamics entails understanding complex 
relational ties between actors, a task that can be facilitated through the use of network analysis. We argue 
that a latent feature of interest to scholars of the political economy of finance is one of social distance, 
which is a measurable concept. Using new data from the financial sector, we measure the social distance 
between a range of financial firms and one key regulator, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), over time to assess whether or not social distance is related to organizations’ advocacy behavior. 
We find a positive relationship between how close a given organization is to the SEC and how often it 
engages in advocacy. The result persists when we control for numerous factors related to organizational 
characteristics, firm size, and when we measure advocacy frequency in different ways.”). 
 94. Per J. Agrell & Axel Gautier, Rethinking Regulatory Capture, in RECENT ADVANCES IN THE 
ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION POLICY AND REGULATION286, 291 (Joseph E. Harrington & Yannis 
Katsoulacos eds., 2012). 
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discussed previously are taken into account.95 If we consider  the 
Availability Bias, it is very likely that the approach of a regulator 
coming from the regulated industry  will be more lenient in supervising 
the industry than that of someone whose career was established inside 
the public sector. This is because the individual probably encountered 
cases while working for the industry in which the regulator disrupted 
her work and interfered with her ability to maximize profits for the 
shareholders of her firm. In addition, behavioral lock-in is also 
expected to occur  on this side of the revolving door. An employee 
coming to the regulatory institution from the regulated industry will 
bring with her the old habits she acquired in her previous job in the 
market. These habits might (and indeed very likely will) include an 
approach which views regulation as an obstacle. Therefore, the 
regulator may attempt to reduce the regulatory burden. This might 
cause the regulator to be more cautious when regulating the industry, 
sometimes even to the point where regulatory powers are overly 
restrained and the public welfare, which the regulator is supposed to 
promote, is damaged. This understanding is reflected in several laws 
and regulations around the world which also require cooling-off 
periods when entering the public sector. For example, upon the 
inauguration of Barack Obama, the White House issued a set of rules 
that try to decrease the negative influence of revolving doors when 
entering the public sector. It did so by setting a two-year cooling-off 
period under which all individuals entering the public sector are not 
allowed to work on anything related to their previous positions in the 
private sector.96 Indeed, such an approach seems sensible when dealing 
with this private-to-public side of the revolving door and is generally 
recommended for all jurisdictions.  
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
Revolving doors in the financial market are a prevalent phenomenon 
and have been broadly discussed in the literature and in the press. In 
an attempt to mitigate the negative impacts of this phenomenon, many 
jurisdictions have enacted cooling-off periods for individuals who 
choose to switch from working as regulators to working for the 
regulated industry. The idea behind cooling-off periods is that, without 
them, it will be easier for the regulated industry to capture their 
regulators.  
This Article, however, questions the benefits of cooling-off periods 
 
 95. Barnes et al., supra note 68, at 372. 
 96. Exec. Order No. 13490, supra note 6, sec. 2.  
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when individuals move from the public to the private sector. It claims 
that an individual who served in a regulatory position and starts 
working for the regulated industry brings with her to the job an 
understanding of the importance of regulation and the knowledge of 
how to implement it. This, combined with her habits, her availability 
bias, social connections, affiliations to the employees working inside 
the regulatory institution, and with the socialization processes she 
underwent while still inside the regulatory institution, will lead her to 
be a much more cautious manager with regard to adhering to 
regulatory demands. Cooling-off periods in this context might actually 
cause more harm than good, as they will detach the former regulator 
from her social group in the regulatory institution and have a cooling 
effect on her behavioral biases which work in favor of the public’s 
welfare.  
The problem, according to this Article, lies on the other side of the 
revolving door—when an employee enters the regulatory institution 
after working for the regulated industry. It is here that the behavioral 
biases and socialization processes which the individual underwent 
during her time at the regulated industry work against the public 
interest and might interfere with her ability to regulate the industry 
diligently. Therefore, cooling-off periods are needed on this side of the 
revolving door in order to ensure that the newly appointed regulator is 
free of the influence of the industry and is not captured by it.  
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